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ABSTRACT
An Analysis of the Black-Scholes Method 
for Valuing Stock Options
by
Amy Anderson Keyser
Dr. Ashok K. Singh, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Mathematical Sciences 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This paper will discuss the Black-Scholes Method for valuing stock options. The 
assumptions of the model will be discussed, especially the assumption that the stock 
market is lognormally distributed. The volatility of stocks will be estimated and those 
results compared with the results given by the companies whose stocks are being used. 
Finally the model will be tested on actual data and the effectiveness of the model will be 
analyzed.
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CHAPTERl
INTRODUCTION OF BLACK-SCHOLES MODEL
The Black-Scholes Model was first introduced in 1973 as a method for valuing 
stock options ([6] Black and Scholes). Although Fischer Black has since passed away, in 
1997, Myron Scholes received the Nobel Prize for Economics because of his work. A 
stock option is the right to purchase or sell a share or shares of stock for a specific price at 
a later point in time or for a period of time. (See Example 1). There are several different 
types of options. A put option is the right to sell shares of stock, and a call option is the 
right to purchase shares of stock. When an option can be exercised solely at the time of 
expiration, it is called an European option. When it can be exercised at any time up to the 
date of expiration, it is called an American option. This paper will be concerned 
primarily with European call options.
Example 1:
The stock of company XYZ is selling for $50. Mr. Jones thinks the stock 
price will go up to $60 before the year is over. Mr. Smith, an owner of the 
stock, thinks the price will go no higher than $55 so he sells Mr. Jones the 
option to buy the stock for $50 within a year. He charges $5.00 per share
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
for the option. Then Mr. Jones may purchase XYZ stock any time in the 
next year for $50 per share.
Since Mr. Jones is acmaily purchasing the stock for $55 per share 
($50 for stock, $5 for option), this will obviously benefit him only if the 
stock price rises above $55 a share. Mr. Smith will break even at $55 and 
will lose money if the stock goes higher. This is a risk that is taken when 
dealing with the stock market.
There are many reasons for buying options. One reason to 
purchase an option is to hedge against adverse flucmations in stock prices.
The option writer does not have to own the stock, but should the purchaser 
decided to exercise the option, he would be obligated to buy the stock, 
perhaps at a higher price than the exercise price.
Since stock prices flucmate, the value of an option is based upon the expected or 
anticipated future appreciation of the stock price. The Black-Scholes model considers 
several influencing factors in order to predict the value of an option.
The Black-Scholes formula is as follows:
T = p N id , ) - se -" N {d ^ )
Pwhere In — +  (r-i )t
s  2
vVr 
6^ 2 -  v V F .
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r  = the fair value of the option.
p =  the stock price at the time the option is granted.
s=  the strike price or exercise price. The option owner may purchase
the stock for that price. 
r= the risk-free interest rate. This variable accounts for the fact that the
option owner will not have to borrow money to purchase the stock 
right now, so he gets an added value. 
t=  the time to expiration.
V = the volatility of the stock, which will be discussed with detail in
Chapter 4.
In = the natural logarithm function and N( ) refers to the normal 
cumulative density function.
Many companies grant stock options to their employees, board of directors, and 
other investments advisors. According to Financial Accounting Standard 123 ([25] 
Statement of FAS), they must report the fair value of these options to their shareholders 
using the Black-Scholes model. For this paper, the 1997 Annual Reports of fifty 
companies were obtained and the information concerning the fair value of the options was 
recorded (see Appendix 1). The companies are not required to report the stock prices so 
those were obtained by numerical methods.
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The Black-Scholes model is based on the following “ideal condition” 
assumptions:
a) The short-term interest rate is known and constant.
b) The distribution of stock prices after any finite interval is lognormal.
c) The stock pays no dividends.
d) The option may only be exercised on maturity.
e) There are no transaction costs in buying or selling the stock or the option.
0  It is possible to borrow any fraction of the price of a security at the short-term interest 
rate. ([6] Black and Scholes)
The problem with these assumptions is the stock market does not normally have 
most of these characteristics. The short-term interest rate is not constant. Most 
companies do offer dividends. Most options in the United States can be exercised over 
the life of the option. Assumption b), concerning the distribution of the stock market, 
will be explored in Chapters two and three. Although the market does not adhere to these 
conditions, the Black-Scholes model may still be useful for valuing options. Chapter four 
will consider different methods for estimating volatility. Chapters five and six will seek 
to determine how effective the model actually is.
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CHAPTER2 
TIME SERIES AND RANDOM WALK
A list of stock prices from a single company is a time series. A time series is a list
of data, recorded at intervals in time. For data that is not a time-series, there is no
concern about the order of the data. For a time-series, the relationship through time is
considered to be of fundamental importance. Many people assume that the stock market
takes a random walk through time; that is, the price of a stock, on a given day, is
independent of the previous day's price. Tests for randomness can be done on time series
data. If the data from the stock market were random, or independent, that would support
the hypothesis that the data is lognormally distributed. ([6] Black and Scholes)
Several tests of randomness exist; two were done on the stock market data. The
first test is to count the number of turning points, known to mathematicians as the number
of maximum and minimum points in the set of data (see Figure 4). If a series is random,
the expected number of turning points (p) will be equal to 2(n -  2)/3, where n is the
number of values in the series. ([16] Kendall) When two consecutive days close at the
same price, they are considered one point. If the expected number of turning points is
close to the actual number of turning points, then randomness of the series can be
assumed. If there are more turning points than expected, then the series is fluctuating too
5
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rapidly to be random and if there are fewer turning points, the series is positively 
correlated. The variance of p is (16n — 29)/90. ([16] Kendall) This will help to determine 
if the acmal and theoretical tinming points are close enough.
NEIMANN MARCUS
GO CO CO GO GO CO CO CO GO CO CO OO
DATES
Figure 1. Closing 
Stock Prices for 
Niemann Marcus. 
There are 51 turning 
points. These are the 
peaks and troughs in 
the graph.
The second test for randomness is phase length. The phase length is the distance 
between turning points. If one point is a m axim um  and the next point is a m inim um , the 
phase length is one. Theoretically the number of phases (s) of a specific length (d) should 
be
2 (n -d -2 )(d ^+ 3 d  + l) 
s =  W + 3)!
where n is the number of values in the series ([16] Kendall). This test also calls for 
comparing the theoretical data against the actual data. If the two sets of data are close 
enough, it can be assumed that the series is random.
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Twelve companies were selected to determine if they passed the turning point test 
and the phase length test. Those results are in Appendix 2. For all companies tested, 
both the number of turning points and the number of phase lengths were well below the 
expected number in a random time series. However, the distributions of phase lengths in 
most cases were similar to what would be expected in a random series. This suggests ±at 
perhaps the series would be random over a longer period of time.
However, the Black-Scholes model values options with an expiration date, so the 
short-term distribution is of greater significance in this setting. For finite intervals of 
time, it is clear that most companies do not have stock prices that are random. Indeed this 
is counter-intuitive because of the nature of the stock market. Stock prices are influenced 
by many things including the national economy, the local economy, the political 
environment, tax laws, the regulatory environment, the legal environment, competition in 
the market place, investor preferences, previous stock prices, customer needs, etc. Since 
the random walk hypothesis does not appear to be correct, it seems unlikely that the data 
is lognormally distributed.
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CHAPTERS
THE LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTION AND 
THE STOCK MARKET
The lognormal distribution is derived by the transformation y = exp(x), where x is 
a normally distributed random variable. The distribution curves of the two random 
variables are similar (See Figure 2). The normal curve is symmetrical and the lognormal 
is positively skewed.
As discussed in Chapter 2, normally a random walk would produce a normal 
distribution. In the case of stock prices, it is assumed that the lognormal distribution, 
which will not have negative values, most closely models the distribution of the prices 
over time. Although the stock market is not random, there are so many factors 
influencing stock market activity that the distribution of prices may still approximate a 
lognormal distribution.
The stock prices for the six-month period of December 15, 1997, through June 15, 
1998, were obtained for fifty publicly traded companies. The natural logarithms of the 
stock prices were calculated using this data. The Anderson-Darling test for normality was 
run for the transformed data of each company, and the P-value and A-squared values were 
recorded (see Appendix 2).
8
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For the Anderson-Darling test, the null hypothesis is that the data is normally 
distributed. This means that a low P-value indicates that the data is probably not 
normally distributed (see figures 3 and 4). Since the data from most companies had a P- 
value less than 0.05 or 5%, the data does not appear to be lognormally distributed.
Standard Normal and Lognormal 
Frequency Graph
0
-------- normal
- - - - lognorm
Figure 2. A 
standard normal 
curve with its 
corresponding 
lognormal 
curve.
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Figure 3. Normal Probability Plot for the Transformed Stock Prices of AT&T. Note the 
higher P-value (0.105) and how closely the data points fit the normal line.
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Figure 4. Normal Probability Plot for the Transformed Stock Prices of Avery 
Dennison. Note the low P-value (0.0000) and how the data points do not fit the 
normal line.
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CHAPTER4
VOLATILITY
The time to expiration, the risk-free interest rate, the stock price at grant date and 
the exercise price are easily determined. However, volatility is a little more complicated 
to estimate since it is a prediction of future events. Volatility is the annual standard 
deviation of the stock price or how much the stock price is expected to change. The 
lower the volatility, the less change is expected in the stock price.
Determining the volatility of a stock is not an exact science. There are too many 
factors that influence the price of a stock that cannot be accounted for mathematically. 
Consequently, if something unexpected happens so the stock price plummets or soars, the 
accuracy of the valuation will be afrected.
There are at least two methods for calculating volatility. The first is implied 
volatility. This method uses an estimate determined by the marketplace. To use this 
method, the fair value of the option is set equal to the exercise price and, through 
iteration, volatility is found through an option-pricing model such as the Black-Scholes. 
Often, this is done using a weighted average. Several different closing prices are 
recorded and the volatility for each day is calculated. The more recent dates are weighted
12
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heavier than previous dates. This reflects the fact that recent activity has more effect on 
future prices than does earlier activity.
The second method for computing volatility is called historical volatility. This 
method utilizes recorded stock prices from the company in which one is interested. To 
find historical volatility, the ratio of the current stock price to the previous day’s price is 
computed. Then, the natural log o f the ratio is taken. Once this is done for twenty days, a 
twenty-day moving average can be found by calculating the standard deviation for the 
twenty days. The standard deviation is multiplied by 15.87450787. This gives an 
aimualized standard deviation, which is the volatility. Again, the running average is used 
instead of just taking the annual standard deviation because the average gives more 
weight to recent fluctuations. ([26] Vince)
Appendix 4 gives the calculations for the historical volatility of AT&T. This data 
was collected from December of 1997 through June of 1998. Consequently this 
information was not available to the company at the time the 1997 Annual Report was 
prepared.
The historical volatility was calculated for the five companies whose stock prices 
most represented the lognormal distribution and for five companies whose P-value was 
zero, implying that their stock prices were not lognormally distributed. The Black- 
Scholes values were recalculated using the new volatilities. The results of these 
calculations, compared with the original values are given in Table 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Table 1. A Comparison of Volatilities.
Company New V. Orig. V. New FV Orig. FV Difference
Johnson & Johnson 0.196 0.215 17.19 17.50 (0.31) HI
Proctor & Gamble 0.226 0.22 17.20 17.14 0.06 HI
Boeing 0.222 0.19 21.13 20.67 0.46 HI
Rite Aid 0.339 0.23 8.99 6.86 2.13 HI
ATT 0.264 0.19 13.15 9.09 4.06 HI
Kmart 0.410 0.3902 5.58 5.37 0-21 LO
Avery Dennison 0.222 0.1774 13.21 12.70 0.51 LO
Commerce Bancshares 0.283 0.21 31.04 30.12 0.92 LO
Hewlett Packard 0.572 0.3 24.76 20.16 4.60 LO
Abbot Lab 2.457 0.25 43.15 16.43 26.72 LO
Notes: “New V.” = the historical volatility as calculated over the past six months. 
“Orig. V.” = the volatility given in the annual reports.
“New F. V.” = the fair value calculated with the new volatility.
“Orig. F. V.” = the fair value reported in the annual reports.
“Difference” = “New F.V.” -  “Orig. F.V.".
Those companies marked “HT’ had the highest P-values.
Those marked “LO” had P-values of zero.
Ninety percent of the time, the original calculation had estimated the value lower 
than the current estimation (i.e. the market was not expected to be as volatile). Four 
companies showed a significant difference in values. The difference in AT&T and Abbot 
Laboratories is attributed to the fact that there was a stock split during the time the new 
data was taken. For Hewlett Packard and Rite Aid, the volatility went up ten percentage 
points. This would indicate that the stock prices for Hewlett Packard and Rite Aid 
fluctuated more than usual during the past six months.
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The most notable observation from these results is that the difference in value did 
not appear to be dependent on whether or not the stock prices were lognormally 
distributed. Hence, the second assumption made in the derivation of the Black-Scholes 
model does not appear to affect the results when using the model.
An approach not normally utilized for calculating volatility is the M inim um  
Absolute Deviation (MAD) approach. The MAD approach calculates the distance from 
the median instead of from the mean. An advantage to using the median as the measure 
of central tendency is that the median is not affected by outliers as much as the mean is. 
Occasionally the closing stock price may close at a very high or low price, only to return 
to the previous level on the next day. The MAD approach does not allow the anomaly to 
affect the calculation of the central tendency, which in turn creates a better estimate of 
deviation.
MAD = median { l x ; - M  I},
where M is the sample median [Hoaglin, et al.].
This approach to finding the standard deviation is used by SCOUT, a software 
package designed to utilize robust methods. The annual volatilities of the ten companies 
were also calculated using this software. The standard deviation of the natural logarithm 
of the ratio of the stock price to the previous day’s stock price was calculated. Since there 
were only six months worth of data, the standard deviation was doubled to annualize it. 
Table two gives those values.
Because the MAD approach does not give as much weight to outliers, the 
volatilities were very low. Perhaps this method would be more appropriate for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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calculating volatility, since it would ignore short-term drops, which would inflate 
volatility. The effect of these lower volatilities on the Black-Scholes value was to 
decrease the value of the option. This makes sense since the low volatility would imply a 
small fluctuation in price.
Table 2. The Volatilities Given by SCOUT. Column three is twice column two.
Company Standard Deviation Volatility B.S.Value
Johnson & Johnson .014 .028 16.20
Proctor & Gamble .016 .032 16.46
Boeing .016 .032 20.04
Rite Aid .021 .042 3.69
A T & T .016 .032 10.75
K-Mart .023 .046 1.84
Avery Dennison .015 .03 12.20
Hewlett Packard .012 .024 18.57
Abbot Laboratories .014 .028 16.42
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CHAPTERS 
A SIMULATION EXPERIMENT
Because the actual stock price data is not lognormally distributed, the next step 
was to simulate a lognormal time-series to see how accurately the Black-Scholes model 
predicted the value of the stock when the assumption was followed. Four time-series 
were generated, each with 120 data points—a sim ilar time period as the real data. The 
first one (A) was generated straight from a lognormal distribution with a mean of 2.6985 
and a standard deviation of 0.2214. The other three were contaminated time-series: (B) 
had a ten percent contamination (the mean was multiplied by 0.9 for twelve data points); 
(C) had a twenty percent contamination (the mean was multiplied by 0.9 for twenty-four 
data points); and (D) had a fifty percent contamination (the mean was multiplied by 0.9 
for sixty data points). The mean and standard deviation were calculated from an actual 
company. A contamination of more than 1.1 or less than 0.9 resulted in ridiculous 
forecasted prices.
After each time series was generated, the volatility for each series was foimd using 
the historical method. Also, the series was forecasted six hundred points into the future, 
the equivalent of five years. Table three gives the results.
17
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Table 3. Results of Simulation.
Volatility BS Value Fore S.P Actual Value Diff
Company 0 409905 5 576 25 79 8.87 3.30
T-S 100 6.108887 14.023 7 86 (9.06) 23.08
T-S 90/10 4.5244 14.023 3.99 (12.93) 26.95
T-S 80/20 13.14644 14.023 3.06 (13 86) 27.88
T-S 50/50 6.164695 14.023 1.74 (15.18) 29.21
Notes; BS Value = the value of the option when calculated via the Black-Scholes method.
Fore S P = the forecasted stock price in five years.
Actual Value = the value of the option, if the forecasted price were correct.
Diff = the difference between the Black-Scholes value and the actual value
(Actual Value -  BS Value).
This simulation produced some curious results. First o f all, although the 
Anderson-Darling test suggested that the Company’s stock prices were not lognormally 
distributed, the difference between the Black-Scholes value and forecasted value was the 
smallest of the four. However, as would be expected if the lognormality of the series was 
necessary, the closer the time series was to being lognormal, the smaller the difference 
between the two values o f the option.
There were several difficulties with simulating in this manner. First of all, the 
volatilities of the generated time series were greater than one. This implies that the prices 
will swing dramatically, perhaps rising by 1300% in the case o f the 20% contamination. 
This rarely happens in a five-year period in the stock market. The reason for these high 
volatilities is perhaps that the data, generated from the random data menu on Minitab, 
fluctuated a little more than is usually the case in real life.
The second difficulty was in the forecasting. The forecasting was also done in 
Minitab using the Pearl-Reed logistic model for the Company and purely lognormal series
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The second difficulty was in the forecasting. The forecasting was also done in 
Minitab using the Pearl-Reed logistic model for the Company and purely lognormal series 
and the exponential model for the contaminated time series. This method of forecasting, 
as do most methods, detects a trend and attempts to predict the values from there. 
Because the 0.9 contamination was placed at the end of the data, the trend for the 
generated time series was downward, so the values were forecasted downward as well. If 
the contaminated data were put at the top of the series, the forecasted price is greater, but 
the difference is still more than the actual data. See Table 4.
Table 4. Contamination at the Beginning.
Volatility BS Value Fore S.P. Actual Value Diff
Company 0.409905 5.576 25.79 8.87 3.30
T-S 100 6.108887 14.023 7.86 (9.06) 23.08
T-S 90/10 5.351002 14.023 21.44 4.52 9.50
T-S 80/20 3.003925 14.013 47.85 30.93 16.92
T-S 50/50 6.111568 14.023 47.85 30.93 16.91
Note; The only changes are in the contaminated data. In this situation, all three of the 
contaminated series have a smaller difference in option value than the lognormally 
distributed series because the data was forced to have an upward trend.
If the MAD approach is used, the volatilities for the generated time-series are more 
reasonable. Using the forecasted data from when the contamination was at the beginning 
of the data set, the results in Table S were obtained. The Black-Scholes value decreased 
for all o f the contaminated data. However, the data was still forecasted to rise at a much 
higher rate so that the difrerence between the forecasted value and the Black-Scholes 
value is still quite large. In this case, the data set with 10% contamination had a smaller
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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difference than the actual data. This is because the actual data produces a very small 
value for volatility under the MAD approach. This also appears to support the hypothesis 
that in actuality, it does not appear to matter whether or not the data is lognormally 
distributed.
Table 5. Generated data with MAD volatilities.
Company Name Volatility BS Form Fore. S.P. Actual Value Diff
Company 0.046 1.838 25.79 8.87 7.03
T-S 100 0.632 7.748 7.86 (9.06) 16.81
T-S 90/10 0.526 6.749 21.44 4.52 2.23
T-S 80/20 0.47 6.193 47.85 30.93 24.74
T-S 50/50 0.826 9.368 47.85 30.93 21.56
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CHAPTER 6
THE ACCURACY OF THE BLACK- 
SCHOLES MODEL USING 
REAL DATA
It is impossible to tell whether the fair value of the option is correct for the 
companies presented in Chapter one because FAS 123 was only enacted in 1995, and the 
stock options are for periods longer than three years. Therefore, the fair values of options 
have not been recorded long enough to compare them with the stock price at the 
expiration date.
hi order to check the accuracy of the Black-Scholes fair value, closing stock prices 
from July 31, 1997 through July 30, 1998, were recorded from thirty-eight of the fifty 
companies whose annual reports were obtained. Then the time to expiration was changed 
to one year and the stock price was changed to the stock price on July 31, 1997. Thus, the 
actual value of the option could be obtained by subtracting the exercise price from the 
closing price on July 30, 1998 (See Appendix 6). If the difference was negative, the 
actual value was considered zero.
The ratio of the actual value of the stock to the Black-Scholes value was 
calculated. The ratio is a better measure of equivalence than the difference since the
21
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significance of the difference depends on the stock price. The ratio was considered 
acceptable if it fell between 0.75 and 1.25. Eight of the thirty-eight companies, or 21%, 
fell within acceptable limits.
Thirteen companies (34%) had a ratio lower than three-fourths. This means that 
the actual value was less than the value calculated by Black-Scholes. Thirty-four percent 
of the time, if a decision to buy an option was based on the Black-Scholes formula, the 
buyer would make at least 25% less than he expected; in some cases, he would even lose 
money.
Seventeen of the companies (45%) had a ratio that was higher than one and one- 
fourth. In this situation, the buyer would be making at least 25% more than he expected. 
Exactly half of the time, the buyer will make at least what the Black-Scholes model 
predicted.
It is interesting to note that for all cases where the ratio was above one, the stock 
price increased during the year. For the cases where the ratio was lower than one, the 
stock priced decreased 74% of the time. This would indicate that the Black-Scholes 
model, although very speculative, would serve as a somewhat accurate guide if the 
investor were fairly certain that the stock price would be higher at the time of expiration.
There is also some question as to whether the differences between the Black- 
Scholes value and the actual value of the option could be attributed to the inaccuracy of 
the volatility estimate. To explore this hypothesis, volatility was recalculated using the 
actual data. The volatility was found using the regular standard deviation and the MAD 
approach. Those results are in Appendix 6. Although the MAD approach found
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volatilities that were different from the actual standard deviations, this produced no affect 
on the ratio of actual values to Black-Scholes values. If the ratio was lower than one, the 
new volatilities produced a better result if the ratio was higher using the new volatilities. 
If the ratio was lower than one, a lower ratio was considered better. For twenty-four 
companies (63%), utilizing the different values for volatilities made no difference. When 
there was a difference in ratio, the volatilities calculated using the actual data produces a 
higher ratio. When the ratios are less than one, the actual volatilities produced a value 
closer to the real value. When the ratio was greater than one, the actual volatilities 
produced a value that was less than predicted.
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CHAPTER?
CONCLUSION
Although the Black-Scholes model assumes that the stock market takes a random 
walk through time and is lognormally distributed, this does not appear to be the case in 
real life. The data is not lognormally distributed, nor does the time series created by stock 
prices appear to be completely random. Also several other assumptions made by the 
model are nut always present in the stock market.
However, the Black-Scholes model can be a useful tool when deciding what 
opaons to buy or sell if  combined with some degree of certainty that the stock will 
increase in price. Also it must be understood that the volatility of a stock is very difficult 
to accurately quantify, which will affect the value given by Black-Scholes. Generally, as 
volatility increases, the option value will increase so it is wise to underestimate volatility 
if one is the buyer and to overestimate volatility of one is the seller, if possible.
Some areas of further study include some ways to better estimate volatility. The 
generally accepted methods of implied or historical calculation of volatility tend to 
overestimate the actual volatility, but the MAD approach underestimates volatility. 
Perhaps a method combining these approaches would produce better results. Also, in
24
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later years, it would be interesting to compare the anticipated values of options with the 
actual value when the time period is greater than one year.
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APPENDIX I
INFORMATION GATHERED FROM ANNUAL REPORTS
Company Name Exercise Price 
(s)
Fair 
Value (T)
Expected
Life(t)
Interest 
Rate (r)
Volatility
(V)
Stock 
Price (p)
360 Communications 4.8 0.0619 0.316
Abbot Lab 41.08 16.43 5.2 0.0600 0.25 43.313
Aeroquip-Vickers, 
Inc.
35.44 13.43 5 0.0580 0.323 34.890
ATT 33.26 9.09 5 0.0616 0.19 31.575
Automatic Data Processing, Inc. 12.43 6.2 0.0620 0.1295 31.935
Avery Dennison 23.19 12.70 10 0.0639 0.1774 24.445
Avon 30.53 5 0.0630 0.25
Beneficial 62.72 16.06 5.5 0.0582 0.263 53.069
Boeing 32.36 20.67 9 0.0660 0.19 37.907
Boise-Cascade 32.24 10.88 4.2 0.0600 0.3 32.003
Commerce Bancshares 30.12 7.8 0.0580 0.21 48.871
Continental 22.62 7.87 2.5 0.0610 0.34 24.843
Coming 24.73 14.45 6 0.0640 0.25 30.059
Dana Corp 31.81 5.3 0.0620 0.196
Diebold 27 7 0.0300 0.19
Disney 52.32 27.26 6.1 0.0640 0.23 60.265
Dow Chemical 69 15.26 7 0.0571 0.1836 55.795
Fleet 47.25 18.27 7 0.0606 0.25 44.907
Ford 25.84 5.76 5 0.0670 0.221 21.743
Gateway 2000 32.63 7.45 3.5 0.0620 0.6 20.769
26
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Company Name Exercise Price 
(s)
Fair 
Value (T)
Expected
L ife(t)
Interest 
Rate (r)
Volatility
(V)
Stock 
Price (p)
General Mills 42.53 11.76 7 0.0650 0.18 36.371
General Motors 51.4 5 0.0620 0.263
Goodyear 38.51 18.58 5 0.0569 0.336 42.625
Grand Casinos 9.47 10 0.0651 0.596
Harcourt General 34.08 17.51 7 0.0700 0.2216 37.005
Hasbro 28 8.64 6 0.0620 0.21 25.957
Hewlett Packard 26 20.16 6 0.0621 0.3 36.479
biterstate Bakeries Corp 12.96 4 0.0640 0.265 34.323
John Deere 30.9 13.70 5.3 0.0620 0.3 32.683
Johnson & Johnson 34.48 17.50 5.3 0.0589 0.215 41.431
Kellogg 35 7.48 3.52 0.0631 0.1983 33.097
Kmart 16.92 5.37 5 0.0647 0.3902 14.023
Kodak 25.76 7 0.0670 0.25
McDonalds 25.67 16.80 7 0.0661 0.213 32.299
Mellon Bank 16.52 9.15 3.5 0.0600 0.25 21.953
Merck & Co 32.97 31.63 6.6 0.0640 0.24 52.569
Niemann Marcus 18.21 7 0.0700 0.311
Nike 11.33 17.39 5 0.0642 0.3 25.433
Office Max 11.78 5.08 5 0.0625 0.345 12.037
Owens Coming 38.15 14.29 5 0.0631 0.2464 39.221
Philip Morris 29.13 10.03 5 0.0638 0.2786 28.041
Pier 1 Imports 11.95 6 0.0614 0.3012
Proctor & Gamble 26.03 17.14 6 0.0660 0.22 33.981
Rite Aid 28.94 6.86 5 0.0550 0.23 25.625
Sears 34.16 17.98 6 0.0619 0.28 38.809
Sprint 10.06 9.66 4 0.0620 0.225 17.431
Texaco 6.92 55.09 2 0.0600 0.186 61.225
TRW 27.81 11.92 6 0.0583 0.2 30.323
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Company Name Exercise Price 
(s)
Fair 
Value (T)
Expected 
life  (t)
Interest 
Rate (r)
Volatility
(V)
Stock 
Price (p)
Wal-Mart 18.66 13.00 5.8 0.0640 0.25 25.170
Xerox Corp 51.76 18.06 5 0.0610 0.235 52.335
Some companies are missing information. These data were not disclosed in the annual 
reports. The missing data did not affect the research in any way.
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APPENDIX 2
RESULTS OF TURNING POINTS AND PHASE 
LENGTH TESTS FOR 
RANDOMNESS
NEIMANN MARCUS SPRINT AT&T
TURNING PO][NTS TURNING PO][NTS TURNING PO]ENTS
St. Dev. 4.36527 Actual St. Dev. 4.44597 Actual St. Dev. 4.48578 Actual
Expected
value
71.33333 54 Expected
value
74 50 Expected
value
75.33333 53
PHASE LENGTHS PHASE LENGTHS PHASE LENGTHS
Length Expected Actual Length Expected Actual Length Expected Actual
1 44.16667 25 1 45.83333 19 1 46.66667 25
2 19.25 18 2 19.98333 15 2 20.35 10
3 5.488889 5 3 5.7 7 3 5.805556 7
4 1.185317 1 4 1.231349 4 4 1.254365 6
5 0.20744 4 5 0.215575 3 5 0.219643 3
6 0.030616 0 6 0.031829 1 6 0.032435 0
7 0.003913 0 7 0.00407 0 7 0.004148 1
8 0.000441 1 8 0.000459 0 8 0.000468 0
TOTAL 70.33328 54 TOTAL 72.99995 49 TOTAL 74.33328 52
29
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BOEING RITE AID JOHNSON & JOHNSON
TURNING PO[NTS TURNING PO ENTS TURNING PO]ENTS
St. Dev. 4.42593 Actual St. Dev. 4.56435 Actual Sl Dev. 4.46592 Actual
Expected
value
73.33333 47 Expected
value
78 65 Expected
value
74.66667 53
PHASE LENGTHS PHASE LENGTHS PHASE LENGTHS
Length Expected Actual Length Expected Actual Length Expected Actual
1 45.41667 16 1 48.33333 35 1 46.25 23
2 19.8 13 2 21.08333 19 2 20.16667 12
3 5.647222 9 3 6.016667 4 3 5.752778 8
4 1.219841 4 4 1.300397 7 4 1.242857 6
5 0.213542 2 5 0.227778 0 5 0.217609 3
6 0.031526 1 6 0.033647 0 6 0.032132 0
7 0.004031 1 7 0.004304 0 7 0.004109 0
8 0.000455 0 8 0.000486 0 8 0.000464 0
TOTAL 72.33328 46 TOTAL 76.99995 65 TOTAL 73.66662 52
PROCTOR & GAMBLE ABBOTT LAB COMMERCE BANK
TURNING PO ENTS TURNING PO ENTS TURNING PO ENTS
St. Dev. 4.46592 Actual St. Dev. 4.44597 Actual St. Dev. 4.36527 Actual
Expected
value
74.66667 53 Expected
value
74 55 Expected
value
71.33333 62
PHASE LENGTHS PHASE LENGTHS PHASE LENGTHS
Length Expected Actual Length Expected Actual Length Expected Actual
1 46.25 23 1 45.83333 22 1 44.16667 33
2 20.16667 15 2 19.98333 18 2 19.25 17
3 5.752778 5 3 5.7 9 3 5.488889 7
4 1.242857 6 4 1.231349 3 4 1.185317 2
5 0.217609 1 5 0.215575 0 5 0.20744 1
6 0.032132 1 6 0.031829 1 6 0.030616 1
7 0.004109 1 7 0.00407 1 7 0.003913 0
8 0.000464 0 8 0.000459 0 8 0.000441 0
TOTAL 73.66662 52 TOTAL 72.99995 54 TOTAL 70.33328 61
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HEWLETT PACKARD AVERY DENNISON KMART
TURNING PO [NTS TURNING PO]ENTS TURNING PQ][NTS
St. Dev. 4.44597 Actual St. Dev. 4.40580 Actual St. Dev. 4.32435 Actual
Expected
value
74 61 Expected
value
72.66667 48 Expected
value
70 51
PHASE LENGTHS PHASE LENGTHS PHASE LENGTHS
Length Expected Actual Length Expected Actual Length Expected Actual
1 45.83333 31 1 45 22 1 43.33333 21
2 19.98333 17 2 19.61667 10 2 18.88333 13
3 5.7 7 3 5.594444 7 3 5.383333 10
4 1.231349 3 4 1.208333 5 4 1.162302 3
5 0.215575 1 5 0.211508 1 5 0.203373 3
6 0.031829 1 6 0.031222 0 6 0.03001 0
7 0.00407 0 7 0.003991 1 7 0.003835 0
8 0.000459 0 8 0.00045 0 8 0.000433 0
TOTAL 72.99995 60 TOTAL 71.66662 46 TOTAL 68.99995 50
For each company, the top portion of the table records the expected number of turning 
points along with the actual number and the standard deviation. O f the twelve 
companies, Hewlett Packard, Commerce Bank and Rite Aid are the only ones whose 
actual amount of turning points fall within three standard deviations, which suggests that 
the data are not random.
On the bottom portion of the tables, the expected and actual phase lengths are 
recorded. Generally, random data have more phase lengths of one than were present in 
the actual data, but the distribution of the number of phase lengths is sim ilar (i.e. there are 
fewer as the length of the phase increases). This suggests that the data, while not entirely 
random, does have some degree of randonmess in it.
The number of data points ranged from 109 -  116 after consecutive matching 
closing dates were eliminated.
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APPENDIX 3
P-VALUES AND A-SQUARED
Company Name A-Squared P-Value
Abbot Lab 20.768 0
Commerce Bancshares 13.308 0
Hewlett Packard 10.258 0
Avery Dennison 6.649 0
Kmart 6.483 0
Diebold 6.41 0
Sprint 5.837 0
Avon 5.659 0
Kellogg 5.644 0
Sears 4.949 0
Grand Casinos 4.385 0
McDonalds 4.022 0
Wal-Mart 3.941 0
Xerox Corp 3.902 0
Goodyear 3.671 0
Owens Coming 3.308 0
Office Max 3.297 0
Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. 3.291 0
Beneficial 3.291 0
Niemann Marcus 3.074 0
General Motors 2.951 0
32
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Company Name A-Squared P-Value
Ford 2.918 0
Nike 2.635 0
Texaco 2.504 0
Continental 2.249 0
Mellon Bank 2.2 0
Fleet 1.824 0
Dow Chemical 1.807 0
Hasbro 1.702 0
Disney 1.647 0
Boise-Cascade 1.614 0
360 Communications 0.7116 0
Philip Morris 1.555 0.001
Merck & Co 1.374 0.001
Kodak 1.356 0.002
Automatic Data Processing, hic. 1.318 0.002
Pier 1 Imports 1.284 0.002
John Deere 1.231 0.003
Harcourt General 1.036 0.01
Dana Corp 0.951 0.016
General Mills 0.946 0.016
Gateway 2000 0.915 0.019
Interstate Bakeries Corp 0.87 0.025
Coming 0.857 0.027
TRW 0.644 0.091
ATT 0.619 0.105
Boeing 0.616 0.107
Rite Aid 0.588 0.123
Johnson & Johnson 0.509 0.195
Proctor & Gamble 0.304 0.566
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APPENDIX 4
HISTORICAL VOLATILITY OF AT&T
DATE PRICE RATIO LN CHANGE 20 DAY ST DEV VOLATILITY
12/15/97 57.250 0.99345 -0.00657
12/16/97 56.875 1.017582 0.01743
12/17/97 57.875 1.021598 0.021368
12/18/97 59.125 1.037006 0.036338
12/19/97 61.313 1.042813 0.041922
12/22/97 63.938 0.965779 -0.03482
12/23/97 61.750 1.006073 0.006055
12/24/97 62.125 1.015099 0.014986
12/26/97 63.063 1.000983 0.000983
12/29/97 63.125 0.992079 -0.00795
12/30/97 62.625 0.97905 -0.02117
12/31/97 61.313 0.959226 -0.04163
1/2/98 58.813 1.009556 0.00951
1/5/98 59.375 1.010526 0.010471
1/6/98 60.000 1 0
1/7/98 60.000 1.04375 0.04282
1/8/98 62.625 0.971066 -0.02936
1/9/98 60.813 1.025685 0.025361
1/12/98 62.375 1.045098 0.044111
1/13/98 r 65.188 1.006704 0.006681
1/14/98 65.625 0.987627 -0.01245 0.025052 0.397684
1/15/98 64.813 1.002885 0.002881 0.024901 0.395287
1/16/98 65.000 1.004815 0.004804 0.024772 0.393246
1/20/98 65.313 0.997122 -0.00288 0.024573 0.390076
1/21/98 65.125 1.007678 0.007648 0.023494 0.372951
1/22/98 65.625 0.998095 -0.00191 0.021769 0.345567
1/23/98 65.500 0.941802 -0.05996 0.02438 0.387027
1/26/98 61.688 1.023295 0.023027 0.024869 0.394787
1/27/98 63.125 0.983176 -0.01697 0.024933 0.395795
1/28/98 62.063 1.013083 0.012999 0.025112 0.398641
34
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DATE PRICE RATIO LN CHANGE 20 DAY ST DEV VOLATILITY
1/29/98 62.875 0.996024 -0.00398 0.025066 0.397904
1/30/98 62.625 1.003002 0.002997 0.024595 0.390438
2/2/98 62.813 1.002977 0.002973 0.022558 0.358093
2/3/98 63.000 1.015873 0.015748 0.022685 0.360108
2/4/98 64.000 0.994141 -0.00588 0.022717 0.360614
2/5/98 63.625 1.002955 0.00295 0.022707 0.36047
2/6/98 63.813 0.990206 -0.00984 0.02092 0.332094
2/9/98 63.188 0.984174 -0.01595 0.020156 0.319967
2/10/98 62.188 0.98995 -0.0101 0.019493 0.309447
2/11/98 61.563 1.019281 0.019098 0.017259 0.273984
2/12/98 62.750 1.007968 0.007937 0.017292 0.274509
2/13/98 63.250 1.005929 0.005911 0.017188 0.272859
2/17/98 63.625 1.007859 0.007828 0.017276 0.274253
2/18/98 64.125 0.992203 -0.00783 0.017297 0.274581
2/19/98 63.625 0.97446 -0.02587 0.018114 0.287549
2/20/98 62.000 1.012097 0.012024 0.018259 0.289855
2/23/98 62.750 0.988048 -0.01202 0.018386 0.291867
2/24/98 62.000 0.996984 -0.00302 0.01288 0.20447
2/25/98 61.813 1.009092 0.009051 0.011965 0.189936
2/26/98 62.375 0.977956 -0.02229 0.012379 0.196508
2/27/98 61.000 0.997951 -0.00205 0.011967 0.189978
3/2/98 60.875 1.019515 0.019327 0.012783 0.20292
3/3/98 62.063 0.992943 -0.00708 0.012837 0.203778
3/4/98 61.625 0.985801 -0.0143 0.013126 0.208365
3/5/98 60.750 1.004115 0.004107 0.012585 0.199786
3/6/98 61.000 1 0 0.012567 0.199492
3/9/98 61.000 1.029721 0.029288 0.014283 0.22674
3/10/98 62.813 1.020887 0.020672 0.014853 0.235785
3/11/98 64.125 1.002932 0.002927 0.014358 0.227923
3/12/98 64.313 1.014569 0.014464 0.014357 0.227918
3/13/98 65.250 1.003831 0.003824 0.013868 0.22014
3/16/98 65.500 0.995237 -0.00477 0.013875 0.220256
3/17/98 65.188 1.002869 0.002865 0.013842 0.219728
3/18/98 65.375 1.008612 0.008575 0.01386 0.220023
3/19/98 65.938 1.031272 0.030793 0.015092 0.239579
3/20/98 68.000 0.990809 -0.00923 0.013879 0.220329
3/23/98 67.375 0.979592 -0.02062 0.014733 0.233875
3/24/98 66.000 1.014212 0.014112 0.014556 0.231066
3/25/98 66.938 0.980385 -0.01981 0.015378 0.244123
3/26/98 65.625 1.012389 0.012312 0.01546 0.245425
3/27/98 66.438 1.000933 0.000933 0.014351 0.227819
3/30/98 66.500 0.995308 -0.0047 0.01442 0.228905
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DATE PRICE RATIO LN CHANGE 20 DAY ST DEV VOLATILITY
3/31/98 66.188 1 0 0.014002 0.222278
4/1/98 66.188 1 0 0.01383 0.219541
4/2/98 66.188 1 0 0.013255 0.210412
4/3/98 66.188 0.99716 -0.00284 0.013341 0.211775
4/6/98 66.000 0.974439 -0.02589 0.014819 0.235248
4/7/98 64.313 1.008739 0.008701 0.01359 0.215731
4/8/98 64.875 1.017341 0.017192 0.013364 0.212149
4/9/98 66.000 1.003788 0.003781 0.01337 0.212248
4/13/98 66.250 1.013208 0.013121 0.013308 0.211256
4/14/98 67.125 0.971143 -0.02928 0.014869 0.236042
4/15/98 65.188 0.972188 -0.02821 0.016059 0.25493
4/16/98 63.375 0.998028 -0.00197 0.01603 0.254474
4/17/98 63.250 0.975304 -0.02501 0.016631 0.264009
4/20/98 61.688 1.008105 0.008073 0.014967 0.237589
4/21/98 62.188 0.972856 -0.02752 0.015781 0.250509
4/22/98 60.500 0.984512 -0.01561 0.015571 0.247184
4/23/98 59.563 0.994745 -0.00527 0.014951 0.237336
4/24/98 59.250 1.014768 0.01466 0.015226 0.241713
4/27/98 60.125 1.010395 0.010341 0.015126 0.240111
4/28/98 60.750 1.021613 0.021383 0.016103 0.255634
4/29/98 62.063 0.987916 -0.01216 0.016218 0.257452
4/30/98 61.313 0.971458 -0.02896 0.0171 0.27145
5/1/98 59.563 0.970619 -0.02982 0.017882 0.283871
5/4/98 57.813 0.996748 -0.00326 0.017838 0.283163
5/5/98 57.625 0.998924 -0.00108 0.01786 0.283524
5/6/98 57.563 1.002172 0.002169 0.017381 0.275918
5/7/98 57.688 1.007575 0.007547 0.017337 0.275215
5/8/98 58.125 0.988181 -0.01189 0.016602 0.26355
5/11/98 57.438 0.992374 -0.00765 0.016431 0.260829
5/12/98 57.000 0.993421 -0.0066 0.015763 0.250238
5/13/98 56.625 0.996698 -0.00331 0.01502 0.238434
5/14/98 56.438 1.042082 0.04122 0.01752 0.278121
5/15/98 58.813 0.996803 -0.0032 0.017516 0.278065
5/18/98 58.625 1.005339 0.005325 0.016904 0.268348
5/19/98 58.938 1.012725 0.012645 0.017072 0.271002
5/20/98 59.688 1.012565 0.012487 0.01629 0.258601
5/21/98 60.438 1.001026 0.001025 0.015896 0.252334
5/22/98 60.500 1.006198 0.006179 0.015875 0.252013
5/26/98 60.875 0.970234 -0.03022 0.016968 0.269364
5/27/98 59.063 0.993651 -0.00637 0.016808 0.266825
5/28/98 58.688 1.019169 0.018988 0.016652 0.264338
5/29/98 59.813 1.017755 0.0176 0.016985 0.269633
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
DATE PRICE RATIO LN CHANGE 20 DAY ST DEV VOLATILITY
6/1/98 60.875 1.01232 0.012245 0.015857 0.251718
6/2/98 61.625 1.004057 0.004049 0.014127 0.224258
6/3/98 61.875 0.991919 -0.00811 0.014277 0.226648
6/4/98 61375 1.032587 0.032067 0.015577 0.247274
6/5/98 63.375 0.978304 -0.02194 0.016617 0.263783
6/8/98 62.000
Average Volatility 0.267885
Column one is the date. Column two is the closing stock price for the specified date. 
Column three is the ratio of change in stock price (B2/B1). Column four is the natural 
log of the ratio (LN(Cl)). Column five is the twenty day standard deviation (ST DEV 
(D1:D20). Column six is the annualized standard deviation, or the volatility (E20 * 
15.87...).
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APPENDIX 5
RATIO OF ACTUAL VALUE TO 
BLACK-SCHOLES VALUE
Company Beginning
Price
Exercise
Price
Volatility B.S. Value Ending
Price
Actual Value Actual/
BS
DBD 48.813 27 0.19 22.61 26.063 0 0.00
m e 30.406 30.2 0.265 4.24 29.5 0 0.00
GND 15.938 14 0.596 4.99 12.438 0 0.00
BCC 37.125 32.24 0 3 8.27 29 0 0.00
KM 11.750 16.92 0.3902 0.67 16.44 0 M
ABT 65.000 41.08 0.25 26.40 42.81 L73 0.07
K 46.094 35 0.1983 13.37 35.94 0.94 0.07
BA 58.688 32.36 0.19 28.40 38.75 6.39 0.23
m 56.938 30.9 03 27.95 42.75 11.85 0.42
o w e 41.250 38.15 0.2464 7.09 42.438 4.29 0.60
NKE 62.750 11.33 03 52.12 45.75 34.42 0.66
HWP 67.813 26 0 3 43.38 56.5 30.50 0.70
ANV 53.875 35.44 0.323 20.85 50.313 14.87 0.71
GT 66.125 38.51 0.336 29.99 60.875 22.37 0.75
MO 45.938 29.13 0.2786 18.73 43.875 14.75 0.79
DOW 93.625 69 0.1836 28.58 92.44 23.44 0.82
GLW 30.125 24.73 0.25 7.43 31.188 6.46 0.87
OMX 14.125 11.78 0.345 3.66 15 3.22 0.88
CBSH 49.828 30.12 0.21 21.41 49.625 19.51 0.91
2 0 » ^
K #
a m
m ^ m
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Company B eg inn ing  
Price
Volatility B.S. Value Ending Actual Value Actual/
83.063%W0:1983 35:45 48.06
73.750 6E03 m s s
NMG
sn m s
^ 6 8 g
m m
GK£
CAIAZ:
\
The “Beginning Price” is the price on July 30, 1997. “B.S. Value” is the value 
that was calculated using the Black-Scholes Model. The “Ending Price” was the closing 
price of the stock on July 30, 1998. The “Actual Value” is the Ending Price minus the 
Exercise Price. “Actual/B.S.” is the ratio o f the Acmal Value to the Black-Scholes Value. 
The cells in Italics are those in the “acceptable” range [0.75, 1.25]. The cells that are 
underlined are those whose stock prices ended lower than they began. The shaded area is 
the area where the investor will make at least as much as he anticipated using the Black- 
Scholes model.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX 6
COMPARISON OF RATIOS AND 
VOLATILITIES
Company Name Actual Vol MAD vol Actual/
BS
ACT/sd BS ACT/ mad BS
DBD 0.027586 0.02 0.00 - -
me 0.017233 0.015 0.00 - -
GND 0.024719 0.021 0.00 - -
BCC 0.021601 0.018 0.00 - -
KM 0.025336 0.022 .01 1 1
ABT 0.047423 0.0001 0.07 0.07 0.07
K 0.017424 0.125 0.07 0.07 0.07
BA 0.171875 0.018 0.23 0.23 0.23
DE 0.019734 0.018 0.42 0.42 0.42
owe 0.022315 0.018 0.60 0.79 0.79
NKE 0.021274 0.017 0.66 0.66 0.66
HWP 0.024685 0.02 0.70 0.70 0.70
ANV 0.018935 0.015 0.71 0.73 0.73
GT 0.015568 0.014 0.75 0.75 0.75
MO 0.019254 0.018 0.79 0.79 0.79
DOW 0.013603 0.012 082 0.82 0.82
GLW 0.023101 0.019 0.87 0.93 0.93
OMX 0.023542 0.021 0.88 1.05 1.05
CBSH 0.028785 0.011 0.91 0.91 0.91
MCD 0.016087 0.014 1.01 1.01 1.01
MRK 0.018731 0.016 1.24 1.24 1.24
DCN 0.017945 0.015 1.29 1.29 1.29
EK 0.02041 0.017 1.36 1.36 1.36
AVP 0.023249 0.019 1.38 1.49 1.49
NMG 0.019508 0.017 1.40 1.42 1.42
H 0.013187 0.012 1.45 1.46 1.46
40
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Company Name Actual Vol MAD vol Acmal/
BS
ACT/sd BS ACT/ mad BS
MEL 0.022939 0.018 1.45 1.45 1.45
JNJ 0.015666 0.015 1.51 1.51 1.51
FLT 0.014822 0.014 1.62 1.64 1.64
HAS 0.021048 0.018 1.63 1.92 1.92
AVY 0.015309 0.014 1.70 1.70 1.70
GM 0.018236 0.017 1.72 1.96 1.96
AUD 0.016329 0.015 1.84 1.84 1.84
F 0.028445 0.018 1.86 1.86 1.86
CAIA 0.021805 0.02 2.01 2.03 2.03
GTW 0.03571 0.03 2.29 3.79 3.79
DIS 0.018175 0.016 2.44 3.78 3.78
BNL 0.026596 0.015 6.34 7.65 7.65
The column “Actual Vol” was calculated by finding the standard deviation of the 
natural logarithm of the ratio of stock prices. “MAD Vol” was found using the MAD 
approach. The original volatility for each company is given in Appendix 5. The next 
three columns are the ratio of actual value to Black-Scholes value for the original 
volatility, the volatility using standard deviation and the MAD volatility respectively. 
Note: K-Mart shows a ratio of one. This is because the actual value and the Black- 
Scholes value were both zero; in essence, the Black-Scholes value was accurate.
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